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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

10 Dec 1945

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY**

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Authority.

By letter of September 20, 1945, the President gave me the following instructions:

"I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity. This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my approval. This procedure will permit the planning of complete coverage of the foreign intelligence field and the assigning and controlling of operations in such manner that the needs of both the individual agencies and the Government as a whole will be met with maximum effectiveness."

Attached is a Plan for carrying out the President's directive. It has been recommended to me by my Staff Committee after several weeks of discussion and study, and I now recommend it for your favorable consideration.

Attention is invited especially to the following points:

a. The Plan sets up a National Intelligence Authority consisting of the Secretary of State as Chairman and the Secretaries of War and Navy, but authorizes the Chairman to call in the heads of other Departments and agencies on matters of special interest to them.

b. The Plan is designed to make fullest use of the intelligence resources of all agencies of the Government, by coordinating their efforts under a comprehensive, Government-wide program. The proposed machinery is an interdepartmental

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organization under the Authority, with personnel drawn from existing agencies, rather than an independent agency with a separate budget. This is considered advantageous because it tends (1) to avoid publicity and (2) to reduce competition and duplication between the central agency and the intelligence organizations of existing departments and agencies.

2. Executive direction of the central agency is put in the hands of an official of the Department of State, but it is provided that the Secretaries of War and Navy must approve the person selected. In that manner the coordinating responsibility of the State Department for matters involving foreign affairs is recognized, but the executive is made a representative of the Authority as a whole, and not merely of a single Department.

3. The central Secretariat is envisaged as a working staff of personnel contributed primarily by the State, War and Navy Departments.

4. The Plan does not preclude any centralized intelligence operations (either under the central agency or outside of it) which may prove feasible and desirable as the program of the Authority is developed. It provides planning mechanisms that may well lead to centralization of intelligence responsibilities in many of the specialized fields, either (1) by vesting responsibility for a particular field in a single existing agency or (2) by bringing together the working units of several agencies on a subject into a joint unit under direction of the Authority.

5. With respect to clandestine activities ("secret intelligence" and "counter-espionage") I understand the prevailing opinion to be that such operations, if they are to be conducted, might well be under a central agency; and the Plan sets up machinery for study of that problem in detail and for development of specific operating plans in those fields.

The central agency is conceived in the first instance as a coordinating and planning mechanism, whose mission is to develop the comprehensive program envisaged by the President; to determine foreign intelligence requirements on a Government-wide basis, and to recommend means and methods for meeting those requirements, making use of all the intelligence resources of the Government. Many agencies, in addition to the State, War and Navy Departments, are engaged in collection and analysis of foreign

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information, including the Treasury, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, the Tariff and Maritime Commissions, the Federal Reserve Board and numerous others. Such agencies can make important contributions to foreign intelligence if they work under a coordinated program, so that, within their special fields, they may serve the needs of other Government agencies as well as their own.

Under the Plan as proposed, the primary coordinating mechanism is a group of interdepartmental Committees for the various fields of intelligence, which, in addition to their planning functions, will "Serve as a continuing group responsible for maintaining a coordinated program and for reviewing the adequacy and efficiency of all operations involved in the carrying out of such a program." Tentative suggestions for the principal Committees to be formed are shown on the sheet annexed hereto.

Foreign intelligence is a vast and complicated subject, touching upon almost all fields of human knowledge. The problems that it involves do not lend themselves to quick and easy solutions. They must be attacked in detail, and from a long-range standpoint, and on a comprehensive basis. It is believed that the annexed Plan permits that kind of an approach to the subject and gives promise of good results if the execution of the Plan is put in competent hands.

/s/ JAMES F. BYRNES

Att.

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December 3, 1945

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

ORGANIZATION

1. Pursuant to a letter dated September 30, 1945, in which the President directed the Secretary of State to "take the lead in developing a comprehensive and co-ordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity ... through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for (the President's) approval" there is hereby established an interdepartmental intelligence coordinating authority, to be known as the National Intelligence Authority.

MEMBERSHIP

2. N.I.A. The National Intelligence Authority will consist of the Secretary of State as Chairman and the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

3. Additional members. Upon invitation of the Chairman, the head of any other Department or Agency may sit as a member of the Authority on matters of particular interest to his Department or Agency.

4. Deputies. In the absence of any member of the Authority, a deputy designated by him of the rank of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary may serve as a member with full powers.

5. Secretariat. The Authority will be served by a Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary, who will be the Chief executive officer of the Authority. The Executive Secretary will be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretaries of War and Navy. If any person appointed as Executive Secretary shall not be, at

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the time of his appointment, an official of the Department of State, he will be appointed no such before assuming his duties as Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary will be assisted in the performance of his duties by such Deputy Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and staff as shall be approved by the Authority. Deputy Secretaries will be appointed by the Authority on recommendation of the Executive Secretary and may be officers of the Army or Navy. Assistant Secretaries and staff will be appointed by the Executive Secretary, from personnel of the Department of State and personnel made available by the War and Navy Departments. The Deputy and Assistant Secretaries and staff of the Secretariat will normally have no other duties. Administrative services, other than the provision and pay of personnel, will be furnished by the Department of State. The staff of the Secretariat may be augmented, on approval of the Authority, by detail of personnel from agencies other than those represented in the Authority.

6. Advisory Groups. The Executive Secretary will be advised and assisted in the performance of his duties by two Advisory Groups, consisting of a full-time representative of each of the following officials:

a. Advisory Group on Intelligence

- (1) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDCS
- (2) Director of Naval Intelligence
- (3) Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

b. Advisory Group on Security

- (1) Chief Coordinator, Treasury Enforcement Agencies
- (2) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDCS
- (3) Director of Naval Intelligence
- (4) Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

7. Committees. The Authority, upon recommendation of the Executive Secretary, will establish Committees, each of which will cover a major subject, area or kind of operation within the purview of the Authority. Such Committees will be the primary means by which the Authority will carry out its missions. Each Committee

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will consist of an Assistant Secretary as Chairman, who will be detailed full-time from the agency having primary responsibility or interest in that field, and of specially qualified part-time or full-time representatives from such other agencies as are determined by the Authority to have major responsibilities in the field. Administrative services for each Committee shall be furnished by the Executive Secretary.

DEFINITIONS

8. Intelligence. As used herein, "intelligence" means all significant information about foreign nations, peoples, forces, events, conditions, capabilities, and intentions which it is desirable to know in order to safeguard the national security and further national interests.

9. Security Intelligence. As used herein, "security intelligence" (sometimes referred to as "counter-intelligence") is the special category of intelligence covering all significant information about hostile persons, movements, ideologies, and activities, whether directed from at home or abroad, which constitute a real or potential threat to the national security or national interests.

FUNCTIONS

10. N.I.A. The National Intelligence Authority, in the broad field of foreign intelligence and in the specialized field of internal security and security intelligence, shall be responsible for the following functions:

a. The determination of national intelligence and security objectives and requirements, including those of all departments and agencies.

b. The determination of the most effective means, in terms of actual operations, for accomplishing those objectives and meeting those requirements.

c. The assignment, through a series of specific operating plans of operating responsibilities to various departments and agencies of the Government based upon the general responsibilities of each department and the extent and effectiveness of its intelligence facilities.

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- d. The continuous review of the adequacy and efficiency of the intelligence and security programs of the Authority, including inspection, as approved by the Authority, of the operations of departmental intelligence agencies to whom operating responsibilities shall have been assigned by the Authority.
 - e. The establishment and direction of centralized intelligence or security operations when it shall be determined by the Authority that such operations can be performed more effectively by a centralized organization than by the intelligence organizations of individual departments or agencies.
 - f. The development of plans for intelligence and security operations in the event of emergency or other changed conditions.
 - g. Such other functions as are appropriate in order to develop comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence and security programs for all Federal agencies concerned with these types of activity.
11. Secretariat. Under the supervision and direction of the Executive Secretary, the Secretariat shall:
- a. Plan the Authority's program and make recommendations to the Authority for carrying it out.
 - b. Act as the executive for the Authority in carrying out such programs and all operating plans approved by the Authority, including any centralized operations conducted under the Authority.
 - c. Direct and coordinate the activities of the Committees, serve as their chairman, and be responsible for the effective conduct of the Committees' affairs, and coordinate such activities with any operations conducted under the Authority.
 - d. Develop the document procedure and all other procedures of the Authority and Committees.
 - e. Provide the Authority and Committees with secretarial service.
 - f. Maintain

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f. Maintain the document files, including all correspondence, agenda, minutes, study sheets, decisions, directives, operating plans, and manuals.

g. Provide other necessary services.

12. Advisory Groups. Each member of the Advisory Groups shall advise and assist the Executive Secretary and shall:

a. Act as an informal channel of communication between his agency and the Executive Secretary.

b. Act as consultant to the Executive Secretary on matters of interest to his agency.

c. Assist the Executive Secretary in carrying out the program of the Authority in so far as it affects his agency.

d. Assist the Executive Secretary in procuring necessary personnel and facilities for the Secretariat and Committees from his agency.

13. Committees. Within the assigned subject, area or kind of operation, each Committee shall:

a. Develop a detailed statement in compiled and indexed form of the national requirements in its field of activity, including those of any department interested in that field.

b. Determine the means, in terms of actual operations, for fulfilling those requirements.

c. Develop, for submission to the Authority, specific operating plans.

d. Develop, for submission to the Authority, plans for operations in the event of emergency or other changed conditions.

e. Serve as a continuing group responsible for maintaining a coordinated program and for reviewing the adequacy and efficiency of all operations involved in the carrying out of such a program.

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- f. Engage in such other operations as specifically directed by the Authority.

PROCEDURE

14. Subject to review by the Authority, all procedures shall be established by the Executive Secretary.

15. The Executive Secretary, in presenting material for the consideration of the Authority, shall be responsible for indicating the extent of agreement or disagreement therein, for transmitting in detail proposals in substantial variance from that of the majority of the Committee covering that field of activity, and for indicating his own recommendations.

16. Committees shall be authorized to establish subordinate working groups and to request assistance in the performance of their functions from individual agencies.

17. Wherever it shall be determined by the Authority that any intelligence or security operation is to be conducted under the direction of the Authority, it will appoint an executive who shall be responsible for the effective conduct of such operation. [The personnel (including the executive); funds and facilities required to conduct such an operation shall be provided by the departments and agencies participating in the operation, in amounts and proportions agreed by them and approved by the Authority, based upon the relative responsibilities and capabilities of the participating departments and agencies.]


18. The Chairman of the Authority will ascertain and prescribe the occasion for and manner in which the decisions of the Authority will be submitted to the President prior to their promulgation and execution.

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Preliminary Organization

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

SECRETARY OF STATE - CHAIRMAN
 SECRETARY OF WAR
 SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
 (HEADS OF OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES TO SIT AS MEMBERS WHEN INVITED BY THE CHAIRMAN; TREASURY AND F.B.I. ON ALL SECURITY MATTERS)



STATE DEPARTMENT PLAN FOR A NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Early in December an entirely new proposal for the centralization of intelligence was brought forward by the Department of State. It was drafted by Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary, who had been with G-2 during the war.

The major points of the plan are brought out in the covering letter from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretaries of War and Navy. Briefly it envisaged the coordination of all government intelligence functions through a system of committees made up of representatives of various departments. No independent intelligence agency was contemplated and consequently there was no idea of having any centralized intelligence operations.

Probably the major defect of the plan was that it made everybody and nobody responsible for intelligence coordination. Detailed criticisms follow the plan itself in this collection.

The McCormack Plan is curiously reminiscent of the proposal put forward by the services members of JIC nearly a year before and embodied in JIC 239/1. Although it is far more inclusive than that proposal there is little difference in the basic conception of "coordinating by committees."